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FREEDom or THE SEAs. By Earl Willis Crecraft, with an Introduction by Edwin 'M.
Borchard. New York: D. Appleton-Century Company. 1935. pp. x 304.
PxEUms the chief fault of historical writers has been their propensity to e.agger-
ate the part that reason has played in human affairs. This propensity may be largely
due to their personal detachment. In his inimitable account of how he ceased to be
a vegetarian, Benjamin Franklin pronounces man a reasonable being because he can
find a reason for whatever he wants to do. Statesmen when meditating in the closet
vast schemes of public benefaction can hardly help thinking of the humors and the
predicaments-the brain storms as well as the dust storms--of particular constituen-
des. Relatively few have had the strength of conviction, the personality and the
unselfish disregard of temporary reverses to breast popular clamor and subdue it.
Modem inventions have made it more difficult to do this. The greatest boon ever
bestowed on the "rabble rouser" is the radio. No less useful is it to the organized
and well financed propaganda, devoted to the sale of political nostrums, international
and national, as well as of cosmetics, tooth pastes and infantile soothing syrups. By
such means are created the mass psychologies which, like the rage of the vulture and
the love of the turtle, "now melt into sorrow, now madden to crime." Woe betide
those who breast them in the latter stage!
The author of the present work has deliberately exposed himself to this peril. Mi
very thesis, although it figured among President Wilson's Fourteen Points, is now
anathema to certain organized groups, which ruthlessly assail those who venture
still to defend it. Immediately upon the appearance of the book the fusilade began,
and this in spite of the fact that its author has merely made a candid statement of
the elements of a problem which requires for its solution the most careful, the most
comprehensive and the most unbiased deliberation. Nor is it a new problem. It is,
as informed persons well know, as old as sea-borne commerce; and the questions it
involves can no more receive in detail a permanent and final solution than can other
questions of commerce, whether by land or by sea, whether domestic or foreign.
This fundamental truth is implicit in the title of Professor Crecraft's first chapter
-"The Great Compromise." To the followers of shibboleths, the exemplars of mass
psychology, the very word "compromise" is odious, because it is supposed to imply
a sacrifice of principle. But real students of the law, whether national or interna-
tional, know better. Law-making is itself a process of compromise between conflict-
ing views and conflicting interests. It is a process of adjustment, conducted in the
spirit of the maxim of the Roman law that one should use his own right in such a
way as not to injure that of another.
Professor Crecraft has evidently given offense to some by saying that, while the
United States is normally among the nations that contemplate peace and neutrality,
England is more inclined to contemplate a condition of war and the exercise of con-
trol over the sea-borne commerce of neutrals. Heretofore this has been regarded as
a self-evident consequence of Great Britain's insular situation and the number and
extent of her overseas possessions. Until lately Great Britain could not conduct
war with any foreign power without using the sea, and, in spite of the recent develop-
ment of aircraft, the same thing remains essentially true. There are those who
seem to think that, in order to avoid a clash with Great Britain, the United States
must renounce the law of neutrality; but they overlook the fact that Great Britain
has herself shown no disposition to make such a renunciation, and thus to convert
every war into a world war. More than once during the past ten years the British
government has announced its neutrality in a foreign war. This fact merely shows
that fantasies have not yet blinded her statesmen either to the realities of interna-
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tional life or to the realities of the Imperial constitution, under which the Rome
government has not the power to commit the Dominion governments to foreign war
without their consent. Beginning with the Declaration of Paris of 1856, the British
government in international conventions repeatedly took advanced ground in assur-
ing neutrals against depredations. Only once has the question of neutral rights been
the cause of hostilities between the English-speaking peoples. This was in 1812;
and when, after nearly twenty years of almost continuous warfare between Great
Britain and her allies on the one side and France and her allies on the other, the
United States declared the existence of a state of war with Great Britain, she shifted
the burden of her complaint from the violation of commercial rights to the impress-
ment of American seamen.
In pointing out the vacillations, the uncertainties and the nebulosities that began
to pervade our diplomacy twenty years ago, Professor Crecraft has performed a duty
which no one who undertakes to deal fairly or intelligently with the subject can
escape. Although the questions at issue are essentially historical and legal, too often
do those who assume to deal with them scornfully brush aside all historical and legal
evidence, in order to clear the way for the emotional acceptance of some illusory
scheme or deceptive slogan offered in the name of peace. Twenty years ago we were
told of the "war to end war." We next heard of the "war to make the world safe
for democracy." We had both to the limit, and the most striking results now before
us are various dictatorships and frantic preparations on an enlarged scale for the
next war. Although it is confessed that the "war to end war" and the "war to make
the world safe for democracy" did not pan out as predicted, we are now offered, with
equal assurance and sincerity, the same remedy in the form of "collectivism," or
combined action for the punishment of the "aggressor." Those who, believing with
Milton that war breeds war, would allow the world a present respite from devasta-
tion, are herded together as "isolationists."
Professor Crecraft's book consists of thirty-two chapters in which the various
aspects of his theme, diplomatic, legal and political, are clearly presented and dis-
cussed. What he has to say merits careful consideration on the part of those who are
capable of dealing with the subject with understanding and with an open mind,
JOHN BASSETT MOORE
New York City.
RESTATEMENT OF THE LAw OF CONFLICT OF LAWS. St. Paul: American Law Insti-
tute Publishers. 1934. pp. xli, 814.
The reviewers of Restatements are a sorely-tried lot. Those who have the hardi-
hood to sit in judgement on the work of an Institute are embarrassed by the multi.
plicity of points toward which their critical attention should be directed. As a con-
sequence, in sheer self-defense, those reviewers who have not been indulged the
sea-room of a leading article have been evolving a conventional Restatement review,
The reviewer observes that the publication of the Restatement under review marks
the x milestone in the work of the American Law Institute. He then speculates as
to the acceptance which that Restatement is likely to be accorded by bench and bar.
Although this convention may not yet have achieved the status of a trade practice
meet for codification, I shall be loyal to it.1
1. This decision was reached with reluctance; the Restatement bristles with statements
inviting comment. What is indicated is not a single review but a series of reviews, one,
say, for each of the twelve chapters, to be prepared, I suggest, not by that jack-of-all
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The Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws, milestone number 4, has been
looked to as a means of mending the behavior of this problem child of the common
law--offspring, I suspect, of a msalliance with civilian jurisprudence. Dismayed
by the promiscuity displayed by conflicts cases in their relations with conflicting con-
flicts doctrine, the legal profession has long sighed for certainty and uniformity. The
Institute has given them 625 rules. Are these rules calculated to satisfy those long-
ings?
For the purpose of formulating a prophecy in response to this question, it is neces-
sary to divide the Restatement roughly into two parts, those sections bearing on the
jurisdiction of courts and those affecting the choice of competing laws. The rules
governing the jurisdiction of the courts of any state are for the most part statutory.
Accordingly, in that vast majority of cases which are domestic to the United States,
if compliance with the statute is undisputed, the only questions open to litigation are
whether the exercise of jurisdiction in accordance with requirements of that statute
may be attacked as unconstitutional and what effect the judgment or decree rendered
shall be given elsewhere. Now these questions, to all practical intents, are questions
of constitutional law; they must be decided with reference to the United States Con-
stitution and over them the Supreme Court sits as arbiter. Yet the Restatement is
not a Restatement of Constitutional Law, and, with a nice regard for editorial pro-
prieties, the Restatement seeks to keep the Constitution in its place.2
It is perhaps because of this endeavor that the black-letter in this portion of the
Restatement achieves a degree of generality which elevates many of its propositions
to the plane of principles, though they remain cast in the form of rules. An effort
to achieve the degree of specification which one expects of a rule would have re-
vealed so open and notorious an association with constitutional decisions and with
procedural law as to have inspired doubt of the purity of the conflicts strain.
One need not quarrel with the terms in which these principles have been articulated
to question the effect of this essentially editorial policy upon the utility of this por-
tion of the Restatement as a determinant of judicial decision or as a guide to counsel.
The problem is rendered the more acute in that the Supreme Court, at least in re-
cent years, has manifested in this field an unwillingness to compromise itself by
the promulgation of inflexible doctrine. It, too, has contented itself with the formula-
tion of principles or of rules incorporating standards of marked elasticity.3 Such a
technique enhances the significance of the factor of judgment in the individual case,
and to its discriminating employment, the Restatement's own generalizations neces-
sarily can afford little assistance.
It is therefore hard to escape the conclusion that, as to those problems of judi-
cial jurisdiction which are most fertile in litigation, the Restatement will not put an
trades, the conflict of laws scholars, but, so far as possible, by experts in the municipal law
of the respective chapter topics.
For the reader who wishes a genuine review of the Restatement in lieu of this esz ay on
the occasion of its publication, I suggest the stimulating survey by Profeazors Lorenzen
and Heilman, The Restatenent of the Conflkts of Laws (1935) 83 U. or PA. L. RE-. 555.
2. Sometimes the Constitution is accorded the privilege of black-letter recognition; more
often it is relegated to the comments; not infrequently its presence is betrayed only by the
more-than-coincidental resemblance of an illustrative case to a decision of the Supreme
Court. Occasionally one is reduced to interlinear reading to detect the Court's influence.
Doubtless a reason lurks behind this seeming inconsistency in treatment. It is not wholly
apparent to one reader, and I think it is likely to elude others.
3. Two very recent decisions are illustrative of this trend, Alaska Packers A-s'n v. In-
dustrial Accident Commission, 55 Sup. Ct. 518 (1935); Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 55
Sup. Ct. 553 (1935).
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end to controversy. The Supreme Court will continue to demarcate the bounds of
state action. The application of rules which include terms "incapable of exact defi-
nition" 4 will continue to depend on judicial judgment, aided, it is to be suspected,
more by case law than by black letter, comment, or illustration. This fact should
disappoint only those who had failed to appraise realistically the potentialities of a re-
statement of this branch of cbnflict of laws.
But what of the choice-of-law problems? Here the wayward propensities of the
cases have been most pronounced.5 Will the Restatement act as an effective disci-
plinarian? At the outset it must be remarked that if the Restatement fails to do so,
its failure will not be ascribable to any lack of determination. The Reporter and
his associates faced a situation more forbidding than that presented to the authors of
any other Restatement. Their problem was not merely to extirpate provincialisms
from a body of doctrine which had achieved general acceptance nationally. Their
duty, as they conceived it, compelled them to restate as "the law" what emphatically
was not law in a great many jurisdictions, and to resolve many questions for which
answers were to be found in the decisions of a very few states. They did not shrink
from the task; they carried it out systematically, even ruthlessly. In Chapter 5,
Status, there are but three caveats, all relating to legitimacy; in Chapter 6, Corpora-
tions, two; in Chapter 7, Property, one; in Chapter 8, Contracts, one; in Chapter 9,
Wrongs, none; in Chapter 12, Procedure, none. Perhaps this boldness is a justifiable
means to the end, but will it be a successful one? For a time, indeed, it may foster
uncertainty. In all jurisdictions where a rule heretofore regarded as settled is in con-
flict with that promulgated in the Restatement, the question now arises whether the
former will yield to the latter. The publication of the Restatement cannot operate
as does the adoption of a uniform act. If, however, the courts of these jurisdictions
yield to the Restatement, this difficulty will in time be dissipated.
Will the courts accept the solutions to choice-of-law problems preferred them in
the Restatement, despite disaccord with the case law of their own states or where
hiatus in that law and the paucity of authority elsewhere accord them latitude in
decision? This is a question to which experience alone can give a definite answer.
Prediction is difficult without recourse to a careful scrutiny of individual sections of
the Restatement and to an examination into the sort of litigation likely to arise under
them. Obviously such an undertaking is beyond the scope of this review. However,
a few general considerations may be suggested.
All the Restatements of the American Law Institute have been subjected to criti-
cism on the score that the form selected for restatement did not permit the develop-
4. After the assertion in § 12 that, saving some exceptional situations, one's "'domlcil Is
the place where his home Is," § 13 of the black-letter defines "home," while the comment
thereto confesses that "the idea of home is incapable of exact definition." The succeeding
comments corroborate the confession. Where, in the comment to § 167, the Restatement
defines "doing business," the definition is unaccompanied by such wholesome candor.
Granting the impeccability of the definition and aptness of the eleven somewhat dehydrated
illustrations which follow, one can scarcely suppose that such exactitude has here been
achieved as to bring uniformity and certainty within grasp.
5. Here, too, the analytical purity of the conflicts problem has been sullied by the occa-
sional intrusion of the Supreme Court. Comments to appropriate sections occasionally
note such incidents, but a caveat to § 43 withholds the Institute's opinion as to the con-
stitutional implications of a choice of law not conforming to the Restatement rules by a
state "having jurisdiction as defined in § 42." The policing of these jurisdictional lines
would impose a considerable task upon the Court, but § 43, I submit, does not work a
"complete identification of the Conflict of Laws with constitutional law," as is suggested
in Lorenzen and Heilman, supra note 1, at 564. Cf. note 6, infra.
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ment of the reasons underlying the rules and principles formulated. In a sense the
Conflict of Laws Restatement is not vulnerable to this charge. Logic is the organon
of justification for the choice-of-law rules selected for restatement. They conform,
for the most part, to a basic theory--call it the territorial theory, pseudo-territorial
theory, "vested rights" theory, or what you will With an occasional concession to
expediency, the rules evolved bear the guise of deductions from this theoretical prem-
ise.6 A court accepting the premise may deem itself relieved of the task of searching
for independent reasons to sustain the conclusions which the Restatement draws there-
from. The likelihood of acqiescence in this method of deciding choice-of-law cases
is augmented by two facts: (1) although the Restatement's underlying theory has been
subjected to acute criticism, that critique remains in the category of juristic esoterica; 7
and (2) little aid is as yet available to the court which might be tempted to seeL
reasons to sustain a result contrary to that indicated by the Restatement.
So long as the choice-of-law problem is formulated in terms of jurisdiction-selecting
rules, I believe this situation will persist.8 Such rules operate without regard to the
effect of the competing laws upon the controversy at issue. But, since the law
chosen determines the result of the case, to disregard its content in the process of
selection is to invite injustice. Militating against the gravitational pull of the Re-
statement theory, accordingly, is the certainty that the number of hard cases which
will follow from unbending conformity to its rules will be large. It has been to
escape from embarrassments arising from the operation of jurisdiction-selecting rules
that the courts have been so astute to invoke "public policy" or so assiduous in
searching for evidence of a choice of law by cofitracting parties. The Restatement
6. Actually, in a number of situations, the choice-of-law rules restated are not neces-ary
deductions from a principle of territoriality, but represent a choice between compzting
rules both of which would be compatible with that principle. This the Restatement ex-
pressly concedes in comments to §§ 65 ("Events Consequent on Acts Done in Another
State") and 66 ("Communications Sent from One State to Another"). And ece Intro-
ductory Note, c. 3. That even "the familiar rule that the validity and effect of deeds to
land are to be determined in accordance with the rules of law of the siLus of the land does
not follow by mere logic, ie., cannot be deduced by syllogistic reasoning, from the [terri-
torial] postulates enumerated by Story," has been urged by Professor W. W. Cook. Sze
Cook, The Jurisdiction of Sovereign States and the Conflict of Laws (1931) 31 CoLr L. Rnv.
369, 383.
7. An illuminating instance of judicial reaction to the arguments of Professors Coo%
and Lorenzen is revealed in Gray v. Gray, 174 At. SOS (N. H. 1934). In that case, thoue
arguments were pressed upon the court which, after examining them at length in its opinion,
boldly stated: "Once the doctrine of obligatlo is disregarded, and recognition of lex loci
is put upon its true foundation, there is no difficulty. The lex loci is applied because this
is deemed the sensible course to pursue. ... No rule or set of rules has been devised which
will make the conflict of laws a logical whole. There are places where logic has to give way
to evident facts. In these places horse sense has prevailed over the deductions of the
schoolmen:' But the court very evidently bad reference to a horse with scholastic leaning,
for after thus evoking the spirit of uncompromising realism, it applied the law of Maine
to deny a New Hampshire wife the power to sue her husband in New Hampzhre in an
action arising out of an accident in Maine on the ground that an analysis of Maine de-
cisions revealed that the acts complained of constituted "no breach of legal duty." The
""doctrine of obligatio" dies hard.
S. In suggesting in this paragraph a criticism of the formulation of choice-of-law rules
which I have set forth at length in A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Froble (1933) 47
Mhav. L. Rr v. 173, I am revealing a source of bias for which the reader of this rev!e L
warned to make due allowance.
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snubs the "public policy" doctrine) and affords little or no play to the intent of the
parties. The efficacy of this tactic will soon be put to test.
Whatever the acceptance accorded the choice-of-law rules of the Restatement, there
are not a few situations in which uniformity and certainty in the law governing in-
terstate transactions cannot be achieved by this work for the reason that the pre-
vailing disorder results from rules which "constitute no part of the Restatement of
this Subject." Thus, the power of a corporation to perform a given act in a foreign
state may depend on (1) whether the law of the state of incorporation prohibiting
such an act applies only to corporate activity within the state of incorporation and
(2) whether a similar prohibition in the law of the state where the act is to be per-
formed is restricted only to corporations of that state.10 To the solution of such ques-
tions of statutory interpretation, conceded to be often "of the greatest difficulty," the
Restatement contributes only a disclaimer of responsibility and a few hints.
This difficulty becomes acute in the debated boundary dividing "substance" from
"procedure." The substantive character of a presumption will depend on the qualifi-
cation accorded it by the forum.1 The applicability of the statute of frauds of
the place contracting and of the forum will depend on whether they prescribe rules
of procedure or rules affecting the formal validity of contracts or both.l2 Whether
limitations on the time in which actions may be brought' 3 or the damages recoverable
therein' 4 are applicable in foreign actions again must depend on statutory construc-
tion. Unfortunately for the searcher after certainty, the determination of these ques-
tions, which the Restatement is contented merely to pose, is a task likely to provoke
disagreement among the courts essaying it.
The Chapter on Administration, 15 dealing with decedent's estates and receiverships,
seems more certain of acceptance, despite the admission that much of it lacks the
support of "direct case authority." The basis for optimism lies in the facts that, as
the Introductory Note points out, "the problems are for the most part administrative"
and the rules adopted tend to facilitate administration through their recognition of
the unitary character of estates. The employment of these rules will work for the
elimination of hard cases, not invite them.
In making evident my belief that this Restatement will not prove the disciplinary
influence it was designed to be, I have reckoned without regard to an extrinsic fact
of great significance. I refer to the impending publication of Professor Beale's long-
awaited treatise on the Conflict of Laws. Keyed for use with the Restatement, it will
put flesh and blood on the bare bones of that work. One can look for argument in
the treatise where one finds assertion in the Restatement; discussion in lieu of com-
ment; case analysis instead of illustration. A treatise of the sort which we know
Professor Beale will give us will provide an answer to many of the complaints which
are directed to the Restatement's form. Indeed, I predict that use of the treatise will
tend to the atrophy of the Restatement. But equally do I believe that neither treatise
nor Restatement can mechanize judgment, and unless and until that is done, the
seekers after certainty and uniformity will secure but partial satisfaction.
Duke University School of Law DAVID F. CAvtRst
9. The Restatement, § 612, states "No action can be maintained upon a cause of action
created in another state the enforcement of which is contrary to the strong public policy
of the forum." Comment c, "Situation in United States," adds "The application of tis
Section is extremely limited." Might it not have been more appropriate to strike out "Is"
and substitute "it is hoped will be"?
10. Id. §§ 156, 165. 11. Id. § 595 (a), Comment c.
12. Id. §§ 334, Comment b; 598, Comment a; 602, Comment a.




THE CONNECTICUT PRACTICE BOOK or 1934; A Compilation of Rules and Forms
Pertaining to Civil and Criminal Actions, together with the Code of Professional
Ethics. Hartford: Printed by the State. 1934. pp. 430, lhx.
THE Connecticut Practice Act, effected January 1, 18S0. has established What has
generally been considered one of the most effective systems of civil procedure in
existence.' There were various reasons for this success. The Act was adopted after
considerable experience in the various states with the Field code or reformed pro-
cedure inaugurated in New York in 1848 as well as with the reform in England
accomplished by the Judicature Acts of 1871 and 1873. Profiting by the teachings
of this experience it avoided some of the pitfalls met with elsewhere and developed a
simple and effective union of law and equity.2 Fairly extensive rule-making power
was continued in the courts, the benefits of which, while not fully realized, have
become increasingly apparent since the creation a few years'ago of a Judicial Council.
But perhaps as important was the state publication of an official Practice Boo!,
available to lawyers and law students, containing not merely the practice provisions,
but official forms of pleadings for the guidance of bench and bar.2 Unfortunately
even a fine practice system, like all orderly processes involving an increasing number
of technical requirements, tends to petrifaction, and some danger may be discerned
lest the originally excellent Connecticut system becomes overtechnical just at a time
when a ferment of reform activity is remolding the procedure of several states and
of the federal trial courts. The publication of a new Practice Book compiled by a
Committee of Superior Court Judges, containing over 300 forms of complaints and
a total of 680 official forms, affords perhaps a fitting occasion to express some con-
cern lest Connecticut lose its procedural preeminence.
The figures as to the numbers of forms in this official publication will indicate the
nature of my criticism. Official forms should not be handy short cuts for the lawyers
to avoid thought of their own. They should be the models which point the way to
effective presentation of the case; or they should furnish the yardsticks by which
good and bad pleadings can be measured. Unfortunately with each new issue of the
Practice Book the pleading forms tend to become more and more prolix and involved.
Instead of being models, they well might be presented as examples to be avoided.
When the last revision ofi the Practice Book, that of 1922, appeared, I commented
upon this very point, criticizing specific forms and expressing regret at the subordina-
tion of some of the simple forms of the original edition taken over from the common
law.4 Some of the forms whose validity I questioned have been retained;5 other
1. So regarded by even the master himself. David Dudley Field, quoted by Simeon E.
Baldwin (chief draftsman of the Act) in Two Crs,;Turs Gnowni or A-,r1=cL,; LAW
1700-1901, p. 317, and (1912) 35 N. Y. ST. BAR As'-N REP. 833; HRTsnoruE, Corrs A:.D
PzocEDvRE n ENGLLND A-ND NEw J-EsEY (1905) 172; K rani's C, sss n; CODE PLLAs;o
(1926) 13. See also citations in note 3, infra.
2. Described above. Clark and Moore, A New Federal Civil Procedurce-l. Pleadings
and Parties (1935) 44 YALE L. J.
3. Rossman, Approved Forms of Pleading (1932) 12 ORE. L. Rrv. 3, citing CL.Aut, COD:
PiaADNG, 162; Cook (1921) 21 COL. L. REv. 416 and Sunderland (1917) 14 Ificiz. L. REv.
551. Issue with Judge Rosman on the effectiveness of the Connecticut forms was taken
by King, Possibilities of Simplified Code Pleading and Practice (1934) 14 Omz. L. REv. 14,
on the basis of figures taken from Clark and Shulman, Jury Trial in Ciril Cases (1934)
43 YALE L. J. 867.
4. C.E.C., Pleading Negligence (1923) 32 YALE L. J. 483.
5. Cf. Com . PRAc. Bx. (1934) Form 232, ibid. (1922) Form 203, "Negligence in Opara-
tion of an Airplane," which, for reasons stated in (1923) 32 YALE L. J. 48S, is belfeved to
contain too many and too few allegations.
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new and doubtful ones have been added; and perhaps more to be regretted, some of
the simple forms have now been omitted.0 Pleading in auto negligence actions per-
haps best illustrates the point. There is a recurring similarity in the cases, and out-
side of indicating the few different types of accident (auto and pedestrian, auto and
auto on open highway, the same at a street intersection) nothing is gained by re-
quiring lengthy allegations of speed, lack of control, and so on. In fact the common
law action on the case for driving so negligently that the defendant's carriage struck
the plaintiff's, thereby causing the damage claimed-which is adapted to the auto-
mobile age in the admirable forms set forth in the Massachusetts statute-gives all
that is necessary.7 To attempt to procure more is to delay the case to secure theoreti-
cally better paper essays, but no more real information to any one; and a skillful
pleader may actually convey less information than otherwise by piling detail on de-
tail. This is well exemplified by the new form herein of model paragraphs of allega-
tions of negligence in the operation of motor vehicles, containing fifteen detailed
kinds of negligence, 8 as well as the other negligence complaints.
Even though an opportunity to instruct the profession in good pleading and to
stimulate it into emulation thereof may thus have been lost, is it likely that the
Connecticut system has been prejudiced by the suggestion of these forms? One
cannot be sure, of course; and the foundations of the Connecticut system were so
well laid that it is still most simple and effective. Nevertheless one senses a some-
what greater regard for pleading technicalities than formerly. There seems less of a
tendency to hold that procedural rules are only a means to an end, where if the end
is attained the means need not be stressed, and more of emphasis upon the rules as
conditioning the contest itself. We may illustrate by pointing to the development of
the rule that one may take upon himself a burden of proof not otherwise his by
affirmative pleading. So far has this now gone that even the salutary statutory re-
form placing the burden of proof of contributory negligence in wrongful death actions
upon the defendant, may be overturned by the plaintiff's careless explanation of hi
case in some detail.9 Thus unfortunately that pleader is penalized who most nearly
meets the pleading objective of stating his full case.
One dislikes to seem overcaptious, and the natural tendency of pleading rules to
crystallize and harden must be recognized. But the Connecticut system is too fine
a thing to allow it to fall into decay. An official practice book affords one important
means of correction. It is obvious that much devoted time and effort has gone into
the organization of this edition-perhaps overmuch if the views herein set forth are
6. E. G., the common law forms of negligence in driving on the highway, CoNN. P11A0.
Boox (1922) p. 452.
7. MAss. Gmr. LAws (1932) c. 231, § 147, No. 13; Williams v. Holland, 10 Bling, 112
(C. P. 1833); 2 CH=-aY, PL-EADING (7th ed. 1844) 529.
3. Form 222, and compare a similar form as to allegations of damages, Form 238, and
the negligence complaints generally, Nos. 217-238. For allegation of "last clear chance"
contrary to Mezzi v. Taylor, 99 Conn. 1, 120 AtI. 871 (1923) see Nos. 223 and 227.
9. Hatch v. Merigold, 119 Conn. 339, 176 AUt. 266 (1935) contra to GEN. STAT. Col.
Supp. (1933) § 1149, which had changed the rule of Kotler v. Lalley, 112 Conn. 86, 151
Ad. 433 (1930) ; (1931) 40 YA= L. J. 484. The earlier cases criticized in Comment, Effect
of Unnecessary Affirmative Pleading Upon the Burden of Proof (1929) 39 YALE L. 3. 117,
are not, however, cited. For an apparent tendency to the "theory of the pleading" doc-
trine, see Rochon v. Preferred Accident Ins. Co. of N. Y., 118 Conn. 190, 171 Atl. 429
(1934).
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sound. One may hope that the judges on their next editing of this official book will
consider with care whether the objective of a pleading model, rather than a lawyers
handbook, is not the preferable one.' 0
Yale School of Law CHAMEs E. CLUMt
New Haven, Conn.
Pnoc. uRE AND Fonas, CoaraON LAw PLEADING. Students' edition. By Roger O'Don-
nell. (Forms prepared or compiled in collaboration with John A. Bresnahan).
Washington: National Law Book Co. 1934. pp. xlix, 459.
TasE book contains 283 pages of text, and differs from the lawyers' edition by de-
voting 163 instead of 512 pages to forms. Every part begins and ends with what.
is regarded as common to common law. Part one consists of three introductory
chapters on the historical development of pleading, the formulary system and theory
of the case, and the classification of actions. Conventional forms of action are
treated in nine separate chapters, which also include "essential averments" in each
action. The next fifteen chapters concern pleading miscellany. Attachment and gar-
nishment and service of process, in two chapters, are treated lasL Part two is de-
voted to forms for the District of Columbia, Maryland and Virginia.
The type is clear and readable. It is doubtful whether the reversion to a modified
form of black marginal headings, reminiscent of the star page days, gives either the
continuity or outline attained by the hornbook style. Footnotes, in the same type as
the principal text, sometimes confuse, particularly as the note line is usually not ex-
tended across the page. The repetition of references to forms at the foot of each page
in chapters 4 to 12, instead of at the beginning of each chapter, serves no useful
purpose. The text and forms are separately indexed.
The text shows incomplete investigation, for example: the statement that detinue
is not used in Maryland,' that detinue will not lie where the bailee accidentally lost
the bailed goods before demand,2 that a bailor cannot bring trespass,3 that the de-
fense of title in a third person requires notice by the third person to the defendant,4
that a landlord out of possession must use an action on the case,5 that negligence in
general is only sufficiently alleged in res ipsa loquitur cases,0 that the tort may be
waived regardless of whether there has been a sale by the wrongdoer7 that an assignee
10. May I express a preference for the older plan of making the Pmcrc: Boor com-
plete by including not merely the Rules of Practice, but those statutes going to make up
the Practice Act. The present separation I find confusing. Still better would ha a com-
plete revision of both Practice Act and Rules to present a single modem unified system.
,Dean, School of Law.
1. P. 43. Detinue was brought in Mylander et al. v. Page, 162 Bid. 255, 260, 159 AtI.
770, 771 (1932).
2. P. 45. Contra: Keflway 160, pl. 2, 72 Eng. Rep. 334 (1511); Southcote's CaEz, 4
Co. 83 b, 76 Eng. Rep. 1061 (1601).
3. P. 58. A bailor at will may maintain trespass. Lotan v. Cross, 2 Camp. 464, 170
Eng. Rep. 1219 (1810).
4. P. 60, 148. For conflicting decisions, see Comment (1929) 27 M1cE. L. Rxv. 936.
5. P. 69. For conflicting decisions, see AmrL, Lwrcru s o. L GA. Hrsroay (1913) 228,
n. 13.
6. P. 75. Specific allegations of negligence were not always required by common law
precedents. Clark, Pleading Negligence (1923) 32 YArx: L. J. 483, 485.
7. P. 121. For conflicting decisions, see Trvmo.v, CAsES o,. QuAi-CorrAcr, (1916)
596, n. 21, 599, n. 25.
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must sue in the name of the assignor,8 that a special appearance must be in proper per-
son,9 that the fourth section of the Statute of Frauds applies to leases,10 that the
act must be tortious where the action is brought as well as in the place where it was
committed," that there are five exceptions to the rule allowing a record to be searched
on demurrer, some of which do not except,' 2 and that a defective pleading can be
aided only by express averment.13 Similarly, some references to code pleading are
inaccurate. For example, it is said that the attempt to abolish forms of action has
proven abortive, 14 that the doctrine of the theory of the case is necessary today in
Code states, as it was before forms of action were abolished, 1 that defendant may
defeat a legal title by showing a better equitable title,' 0 and that demurrers have been
abolished.'
7
Except for references to illustrative cases found in casebooks, and the citation of
a few other, cases, there is dearth of supporting authority for the text. The cases
cited are not criticized or compared, nor are contra holdings given. No reference to
periodical material appears in the footnotes, nor is there any reference to the rules of
civil procedure proposed by the American Judicature Society. The forms are not an-
notated, nor is it indicated whether they are liberal translations of, or are taken
literathn from reported cases. And there is no bibliography or appendix, As simple
pleading problems not infrequently consume hours of research and study of single
instances, new and old, grave doubts rarely being resolved by any other method, the
text treatment, coupled with the use of unannotated forms, may readily prove mis-
leading to students.
As pictured, the system of common law pleading took form during the reign of
Henry II, growing and expanding up to the nineteenth century, all defects being in
some way removed.18 The principles are likened to the law of gravity'0 and the un-
8. P. 131. For statutes permitting the assignee to sue in his own name, see MD. Con
(1924) art. 8, § 1; VA. Cone (1930) § 5768; D. C. CODE (1929) tit. 2, c. 1, §§ 1-4.
9. Pp. 138, 139. A special appearance may be entered by attorney. Harkness v. Hyde,
98 U. S. 476, 479 (1878).
10. P. 155. The fourth section of the Statute of Fraud applies only to executory con-
tracts to lease. Trr.Y, LANDLORD A~w TENANT (1910) § 25.
11. P. 174. It is usually said that the law of the place where the act was committed
governs. REsTATEExT, ConrnacT or LAws (1934) § 378. But see Cook, Tort Liability
and the Conflict of Laws (1935) 35 COL. L. R. 202.
12. P. 206. For a clear statement of the exceptions, see BALLAwTI 'S SIUrPWAN, Co2.mtot
LAw PLEADING (3d ed. 1923) 285-287.
13. P. 209. The prevailing rule is said to permit aider by express denial of a necessary
omitted allegation. Shipman, op. cit. supra, n. 12, at 292, n. 48.
14. P. 16. A few decisions resulting from too much digging in the legal graveyards rep-
resent the only instances of the survival of the forms of action.
15. Pp. 17-19. "The suggestion seems clearly modern philosophizing and not a coun.
temporaneous view of common law pleading." CLuAR, CODE PLEADING (1928) 179, n. 146.
For conflicting decisions in common law and code states, see Comment (1935) 83 U. or
PA. L. Rxv. 654.
16. P. 116. For conflicting decisions, see Hutchins, Equitable Title in Ejectrnent (1926)
26 Cor.. L. Rv. 436.
17. P. 139, n. 6. Demurrers are used in all code states except New York, New Jersey,
Michigan, Iowa (law cases) and Illinois. Cru, CoDE PLEADING (1928) 371 n. 124: Ir,,
Civ. PRo. Acr (1933) art. 4, § 45.
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changeable spots of a leopard. 20 Thus this system, embalmed in perfection, is yet
a "speaking, militant thing."2 ' Considering that the system has been discarded by
statute in England and in twenty-nine American States, can it be validly contended,
as the author states,22 that its study is indispensable for the student of code plead-
ing?2 3
The author indulges in some special pleading for the text method, contending
"that very few, if any, persons can acquire a knowledge of common law pleading and
procedure solely by the use of case books." 24 The fact that only four approved schools
employ the text method in the course in common law pleading, however, shows that
the consensus of opinion among law teachers is to the contrary. In justification of
the treatment of the subject as attempted in his own text, in particular, the author
assumes "that the pleader" using it "has a working knowledge of the substantive
law or (sic) Torts."25 This assumption as to the necessary preliminary preparation
for the study of common law pleading is widely concurred in, and explains why prac-
tically all approved schools have substituted a first year course in modem pleading
and procedure for the course in common law pleading.
For clear statement and simplicity of treatment, the book has merit. The author
has made it possible for students to become acquainted with some of the outstand-
ing features of the common law system of pleading without becoming immersed in an-
cient rules which are of little or no importance today. It may be that he has achieved
his stated purpose2 6 of bringing "the blind by a way that they knew not," leading
"them in paths they have not known," and making "darkness light before them and
crooked things straight."12 7 But the student of pleading and the neophyte in practice
should not be unmindful of the words of the prophet of old, appearing in the next
verse,25 lest they describe his experience more accurately. There Isaialh said:
"They shall be greatly ashamed, that trust in graven images, that say to molten




AR LAw; OUTLINE AD GUIDE To LAW oF RADIO AND AEROxAuTics. By Horwd
S. Le Roy. Washington: R. Leigh Pub. Co. 1935. 120p.
The author of this book is a member of a Washington law firm which specializes
in aeronautic and radio law. He was legal adviser to the American delegation at the
International Radio-Telegraph Conference in 1927, and has lectured at the National
University Law School on air law.
As the title indicates, the book is in outline form. Under the headings of radio
20. P. vii. 21. P. v.
22. P. vi
23. Cf. Book Review (1933) 47 HARv. L. REv. 148. Dean Clark, while stating that
history should be used to explain the development of modem rules, has said: ". . . in-
culcation of common-law pleading doctrines is the worst possible approach to modem
pleading conceptions, for it gives the student so much more to unlearn.
24. P. vi. 25. P. 62.
26. P. v. 27. IsAIAH 42:16.
28. Id. 42:17.
jAssociate Professor of Law.
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and aeronautic law are listed statutes and ordinances of the United States and of
individual states and cities, as well as decisions of the courts and opinions of attorneyg
general; all of these are in chronological order. Foreign and international law are
treated in the same manner. There is an excellent bibliography at the end of the
book, which lawyers and law librarians should find indispensable.
J. S. G.
